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Introduction 
New Jersey implemented tax incentives for the most economically distressed 
municipalities in the state. The New Jersey Economic Opportunity Act (NJEOA) of 2013 merged 
all of the state’s economic development incentive programs with the goal of attracting and 
retaining businesses and creating and maintaining jobs in order to strengthen New Jersey’s 
competitive edge in the domestic and global economy. The NJEOA created two main economic 
development programs – the Grow New Jersey Assistance Program (Grow NJ), which is now the 
main job creation incentive program, and the Economic Redevelopment and Growth Program 
(ERG), which is the state’s key incentive program for development projects. The focus of this 
paper will be on analyzing the impacts of tax incentive programs and determining whether or not 
these programs impact business location decisions and economic development. More 
specifically, I will be determining how these programs affect location decisions, and whether 
they impact economic growth in the local economy. There is a lot of debate about whether or not 
tax incentive programs are actually effective in stimulating economic growth. Policymakers 
should know whether or not there are beneficial impacts and if not, they need to know how 
policies can be redesigned to be more effective. By analyzing tax incentive policies and 
understanding which components of the policy are beneficial and which are not, ideally, policy 
makers will be able to set policies that are efficient in order for our economy, and more 
specifically economically depressed areas, to improve and succeed. 
Incorporated into the policy are key targeted areas that result in different benefits if a 
business locates or creates/retains jobs in the designated location. The first main incentive area is 
the Distressed Municipality category (as seen in Table 1). A municipality’s distress level is 
measured by combining average annual population change, children on Temporary Assistance 
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for Needy Families (TANF), per capita income, unemployment rate, equalized three year tax 
rate, equalized valuation per capita, and substandard housing condition. The combination of 
these indicators goes into the Municipal Revitalization Index (MRI) which was created by the 
state’s Department of Community Affairs (DCA), and it ranks all of the cities and townships in 
NJ by their economic distress level. The first 65 townships and cities with the lowest MRI score 
are considered to be part of this area. Stemming from the MRI calculation, the second incentive 
area includes the Garden State Growth Zones (GSGZ), which are the top five most distressed 
municipalities and include Atlantic City, Camden, Passaic, Paterson, and Trenton. These areas 
are considered the most distressed because they were identified to have significantly lower levels 
of income per capita and higher levels of unemployment rate, poverty rate and crime rate. For 
example, in 2012 prior to the policy’s implementation, Camden, NJ had an unemployment rate 
of 18.1%, two times greater than the state’s rate, a poverty rate of 38.6%, nearly four time greater 
than the state’s rate, and a total crime rate of 75.1 per 1000 (in 2009), compared to 23.9 per 1000 
in the state. The third incentive area are the Urban Transit Hubs (HUB), which include 
Bridgeton, Camden, East Orange, Elizabeth, Hoboken, Jersey City, Mount Holly Township, New 
Brunswick, Newark, Paterson, Salem, Trenton, and West New York Town. These areas are 
targeted because they are deemed by the state to be key transit locations. Lastly, there are several 
other priority areas that are metropolitan and suburban areas not included in the distressed 
municipality category. Aside from location, the size of projects can also generate additional 
benefits – Mega projects that involve large scale investment and/or employment are subject to 
program benefits similar to the those received for locating in the incentive zones. 
In order to be approved for benefits through the Grow NJ program, a firm must meet a 
minimum level of employment, capital investment, and green building requirements, and the 
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proposed project must pass a cost-benefit test performed by the state’s Economic Development 
Authority (EDA). Additionally, the company’s CEO must attest that the financial award is a 
material factor in the firm’s decision to remain and/or locate in New Jersey.  The size of tax 
incentive that the company will receive is contingent upon the projected number of jobs created 
and/or retained in the state. The incentives are given as a transferable credit against the 
corporation business tax and insurance premium tax. Base awards for the program range from 
$500 to $5,000 per new or retained job, dependent upon the location and type of project. The 
base awards levels are laid out in Table 2. In addition to the base awards, companies can receive 
bonus awards. Bonus awards can go to businesses in certain targeted industries, transit oriented 
development, capital investment in industrial sites that exceed the minimum requirements by 
20% or more, and solar energy generation. There are also cases where certain minimum 
requirements are relaxed, and award incentives are increased – this mainly occurs for projects in 
the Garden State Growth Zones and in the following southern New Jersey counties: Atlantic, 
Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Ocean, and Salem. In these areas, the 
minimum employment requirements are reduced by one quarter, and the capital investment 
requirements are reduced by one third. These areas also receive 100% of the calculated per job 
amount for new and retained jobs, whereas projects outside of the aforementioned areas receive 
awards equal to the lesser of either 50% of the calculated amount for new jobs or the capital 
investment divided by 10 divided by the total number of new and retained jobs.  
Before final approval, a cost-benefit model is applied to the project by the NJ EDA to 
determine the future fiscal benefits of the project in terms of state and local tax revenues 
generated by the proposed project. This calculated value is compared against the annual value of 
the given tax credit to complete the cost benefit analysis. All approved projects and awards 
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remain active for four years, and if the project is not completed nor received certification of its 
employment within the four year window, the award is rescinded.  
The ERG Program in the Act serves to provide gap financing to developers whose 
projects are not projected to generate sufficient revenue to cover the debt incurred for completion 
of the project. The focus of this component of the NJEOA is to assist residential and commercial 
projects with their financing. These two types of projects are eligible for base awards in the form 
of tax credits or reimbursement grants of up to 20% of total project costs. Mixed-use parking 
projects are also targeted in this program and they are eligible for base award tax credits up to 
100% of the parking component of the total project costs and up to 40% of the non-parking cost 
component. Similar to the Grow NJ program, certain location decisions and project types are 
subject to an additional bonus in the form of a reimbursement or tax credit. Projects located in 
the Garden State Growth Zones are subject to an additional bonus of 20% of project costs. Also, 
projects located in a transit designated area, disaster recovery area, aviation area, tourism 
designation area, and/or a distressed municipality lacking adequate access to a supermarket or 
health care services are subject to an additional bonus of 10% of total costs. If the project is a 
new residential project, it is required to meet the affordable housing requirements, with at least 
20% of units reserved for low to moderate income households. Commercial ERG projects are 
required to pass a cost-benefit test, similar to the Grow NJ criteria, based on the revenue the state 
is projected to gain from the project.   
In this paper, I will investigate whether the NJEOA has had significant effects on 
business decisions in New Jersey and whether it has impacted the economies of the targeted 
zones as deemed in the policy. The following sections will consist of a review of the literature on 
tax incentive policy and its effectiveness in the past, a difference in difference regression 
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analysis regarding the policy, and a descriptive data analysis of the effects of the policy. By 
analyzing data regarding the changes in difference economic measurements as a result of this 




As mentioned before, there have been many studies regarding the effectiveness of tax 
incentive programs, but these studies have very mixed findings. Some researchers argue that 
these programs are key determinants to economic growth, while others claim that incentive 
programs are zero-sum games that lead to a redistribution of resources and with no net positive 
societal gains. In this section, I summarize what the literature has to say. I have included 
analyses from multiple perspectives to capture the overall debate regarding this topic, and I 
expect to have findings that support both sides of the argument.  
Before analyzing the effectiveness of incentive programs, it is helpful to know in a 
general sense what factors cause businesses to decide on a location. A study completed by 
Milward and Newman (1989), analyzes the business and nonbusiness factors relevant in location 
determination using Nissan, Mazda, Saturn, Diamond-Star, Toyota, and Fuji-Isuzu auto 
companies as case studies. In general, the six case studies reveal the importance of easy access to 
transportation, the rapid escalation in the costs associated with industrial recruitment, and the 
dramatic increase in the number of states vying for new auto assemblies.  
More specifically, the analysis of Nissan highlights the relevance of worker training 
programs, road access and improvements, tax inducements, the state’s commitment to establish 
and open dialogue with the investing company, and a positive business climate. The analysis of 
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Mazda highlights the importance of labor relations/conditions of employment, infrastructure 
improvements, and government grants and incentives. Saturn’s analysis shows that their decision 
was impacted by transportation access, the state’s pro-business attitude, and the variety of 
housing, recreational, cultural, and educational opportunities in the local area. Diamond Star 
Motors highlights the importance of a modern transportation system, a superior education 
system, cultural advantages, a good labor climate, and a favorable tax base. Toyota’s analysis 
emphasizes the importance of business climate, living conditions, local auto parts makers, tax 
regulations, and labor costs. Lastly, Fuji Isuzu’s locational decision was based on manufacturing 
benefits, business climate, and quality of life. Overall, Milward and Newman (1989) demonstrate 
that business location decision is impacted by different factors depending on company 
preferences and cultures, however, the main significant incentives are worker training programs, 
transportation access, and a strong quality of life in the local area.  
Businesses can use a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) model when considering the policies 
and benefits included in the tax incentive programs. Buss and Yancer (1999) show that the use of 
a CBA method for assessing choices among competing uses of resources can play a crucial role 
in economic decision making. The purpose of a CBA is to define forgone benefits relative to 
economic goals. In the case of targeted economic development programs, the authors find that 
the new jobs that are created via these programs must be accompanied by a reduction in another 
program, causing an equivalent number of jobs lost in the overall economy. Therefore, the use of 
economic incentive programs to generate jobs actually creates a redistribution of jobs from one 
location to another.  
The CBA can also be used by policy makers to focus on externality problems; if firms are 
offered tax incentives for relocation, the heightened economic activity will increase land values, 
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the demand for public services, and the use of infrastructure (e.g. more pollution, traffic 
congestion). The increased use of these systems costs money to repair, making infrastructure 
costs rise for residents, which may pose a problem for the poorer residents who resided in the 
area before the economic growth and who may not be able to afford living in the area anymore. 
Additionally, the poorer residents must also now compete for jobs with a more qualified 
workforce. Overall, Buss and Yancer (1999) show that tax incentive programs are effective for 
business relocation, however, there are negative externality costs that will impact the livelihoods 
of residents, thus questioning the real value of benefits from tax incentive programs. 
After taking these business decision factors into account, Buss (2001) provides an 
overview of tax incentive literatures that measures the effects of tax incentives on economic 
growth and firm location decisions. The most common use of tax incentive programs is for 
public officials to protect the state from losing business to other states, shield businesses from 
competition, rescue failing firms, attract out-of-state firms, or start new businesses. The idea 
behind tax incentives is that the incentives provided in tax credits will eventually be repaid 
directly in taxes to government or indirectly via economic growth, which will lead to an increase 
in taxes in the future. Buss (2001) finds that the relocation of investment from areas with low 
unemployment to areas with high unemployment helps generate efficiency gains as the economy 
taps underused resources and addresses market failures in those areas with higher unemployment 
levels. Overall, this analysis concludes that tax incentive programs have positive effects on 
economic growth and location decisions.  
Buss (2001) also discusses the problems with current policies and the lack of proper data 
analysis methods. Most research fails to measure the extent to which markets have failed and tax 
incentives have been justified because there are no databases that exist and will provide accurate 
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and timely data. Because of this, researchers must use statistical and econometric models in order 
to try and estimate the effects of incentive programs.  
Buss’s (2001) findings regarding policy implications are that the tax literature in general 
provides little guidance to policy makers trying to better economic development and that policies 
must provide different incentives for different industries in order to be the most effective. Buss 
(2001) suggests the following steps to create the most efficient policies: 1) requirement of cost 
benefit studies prior to making large incentive awards; 2) requirement of periodic evaluations of 
all tax incentive programs; 3) requirement of sunset provisions for all economic development 
legislations; 4) requirement of truth and disclosure in financing provisions; 5) requirement of 
legally binding contracts that will penalize firms if they do not meeting states goals; 6) avoidance 
of redistributing wealth; 7) concentration on diverse industrial sectors; and 8) encouragement of 
public participation in tax incentive program development to foster public accountability. If 
policy makers follow these guidelines, an efficient and effective tax incentive program should be 
able to be developed and should stimulate economic growth.  
In another study of the effectiveness of tax incentive programs, Goss and Phillips (1999) 
analyze data from Nebraska’s Department of Revenue on business tax incentive programs, and 
they discuss the correlation between state tax incentive programs and economic outcomes. The 
study shows that economic development programs draw business activity to more densely 
populated areas, and that there is an overall positive impact on population growth, with the 
impact being more significant for larger cities compared to smaller towns and villages. Contrary 
to Buss (2001), Goss and Phillips (1999) show that business generation is more effective in areas 
with low unemployment. For counties with unemployment above the mean, investment activity 
was not statistically significant on economic growth. Lastly, the study shows that activity is 
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drawn to areas with higher experience levels of past manufacturing investment. When the tax 
incentive offer is the same across multiple locations, businesses are more likely to locate in areas 
of lower unemployment and higher past manufacturing investment. By taking these conclusions 
into consideration and recognizing that tax incentives tend to be focused on those areas already 
expected to do well,  other states can pass new legislations that will help promote business 
investment in areas lagging in economic performance; this can be done by creating enterprise 
zones with additional incentives for relocation.  
Luger and Suho (2005) estimate the numerical effectiveness of state tax incentive 
programs through their analysis of the effects of different types of tax credits, using North 
Carolina as a case study. Job creation tax credits based on a tiered system are shown to reduce a 
typical firm’s labor costs by 0.07 – 3.38% depending on the level of financial distress, which is 
measured by real GDP of the area; businesses locating in more distressed locations would have 
more cost-reduction benefits. This reduction in labor costs resulted in an increase in employment 
in NC businesses by 0.07% to 6.75%, again depending on location and wage level of the specific 
city. And the overall increase of workers per firm is 0.03 – 5.38 workers depending on the value 
of the labor supply elasticity; tier 1 represents the most distressed areas where worker 
employment is more sensitive to wage changes than in lower tiers. 
Luger and Suho (2005) also analyze the effectiveness of machinery and equipment 
(M&E), central administration offices (CAO), research and development (R&D), and worker 
training tax credits. The study found that there is a large effect on M&E demand; firms hire more 
workers to use the additional M&E. The user cost of CAO decreases with the tax credit, which 
increases demand for CAO, resulting in additional employment that is needed to manage 
building and physical structures. For R&D tax credits, the authors found there was a 5.41% 
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reduction in user cost for R&D, regardless of the investment amount or location. Lastly, worker 
training tax credits were shown to reduce the cost of training by the same amount, regardless of 
average training costs for the business.  
Additionally, Luger and Suho (2005), like Buss (2001), discuss the general challenges of 
data collection when trying to analyze tax incentive programs. The main methods of data 
collection are surveys, case studies, econometric analyses, general equilibrium analyses, and 
simulations. Surveys help identify the relative importance of various factors for location but are 
subject to selection bias because they typically include only those businesses receiving tax 
incentives. Case studies provide an in-depth understanding of one/few programs, but the findings 
are difficult to generalize. Econometric analyses allow direct measurement of the tax incentives’ 
effect on location decision and economic growth but fail to control for other important factors 
such a quality of public services. General equilibrium analyses require large amounts of data, 
sophisticated modeling, and extensive computation. Lastly, simulations compare tax burdens 
among jurisdictions rather than estimate the induced benefits of the tax incentive program. Each 
method has its flaws and there has not been a method used yet that fully captures the true value 
of benefits (or lack thereof) as a result of a tax incentive program. Therefore, Luger and Suho 
(2005) state that there needs to be better data analysis methods in order to truly determine the 
advantages and disadvantages of tax incentive packages and their effects on business location 
and economic development. 
Overall,  Luger and Suho (2005) found that the use of tax credits in general lowers 
recipient firm’s real source costs and increases their demand for factors being credited. They also 
add that the tiered incentive system is particularly effective in encouraging firms to invest more 
and hire more workers in economically distressed areas. 
 13 
As did Luger and Suho (2005) and Buss (2001), Sridhar (1996) finds that economic 
development policies do, in fact, produce net benefits for the municipality imposing them. By 
using the term reservation wage, which is defined as the lowest price at which an individual is 
willing to work and estimates as a function of unemployment, Sridhar (1996) explains that there 
is a social net benefit as long as the wages paid are higher than the reservation wage. Using this 
model, the study shows that in high unemployment areas, the benefits from a given number of 
jobs would be higher because of lower reservation wages and greater net benefits per job.  This 
model also shows that there is a net social benefit as long as the jobs created provide a greater 
benefit to those in the enterprise zone than an alternative location that would’ve had the jobs 
without the tax incentive program.  
In the analysis, Sridhar (1996) proposes two scenarios: the first scenario is that all jobs 
are new, and the second scenario is that all jobs are assumed to relocate to low unemployment 
areas from somewhere else within the state. Scenario one results are that the average net benefit 
per job is higher than the cost per job, meaning that there is an overall societal net benefit from 
the economic development policy. Scenario two results are that there is a loss of benefits 
(negative societal net benefit) if jobs were redistributed from high unemployment to low 
unemployment areas. Additionally, in scenario two, moderate and high unemployment areas 
have positive benefits because benefits per job are higher and reservation wages are lower. 
Overall, Sridhar (1996) complements Buss (2001) by concluding that the benefits of 
redistribution are likely to be higher in high unemployment areas than low unemployment areas 
and if economic development policy is to be positive sum, the policy should focus on 
encouraging job growth, not just relocation.  
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Contrary to Buss (2001), Sridhar (1996) and Luger and Suho (2005), Dabney (1991) 
finds that overall, the impact of enterprise zone incentives has a small effect on business location 
decision making. Only when the value of the enterprise zone incentive is large relative to the 
amount of the company’s investment is there a significant impact on the location decision. This 
is the case because for a majority of businesses, the tax incentives that are offered are offset by 
higher economic costs, such as insurance, transportation, and access to raw materials. These 
costs would negate the tax benefit, thus providing no overall benefits to the company. 
However, Dabney (1991) also finds that there is a significant positive change in business 
location for small independent firms, and firms in the health, education, and government 
classification. Due to size the incentives relative to investment, small independent firms are more 
easily swayed by tax incentives. Additionally, the aforementioned industries are more likely to 
relocate due to tax incentive programs because the typical incentives are higher in these 
industries than in others. Despite these positive effects, the typical enterprise zone program, 
which consists of limited tax incentives and regulatory relief, is unable by itself to adequately 
address the necessary factors found to be relevant in most business location decisions. 
Overall, the literature seems to align with the initial prediction that there are mixed 
findings regarding tax incentive programs’ effectiveness for economic growth. There are some 
limitations because of the sample size of this literature review, however, it is logical that the 
findings are mixed because there are so many different papers written and perspectives provided. 
Some authors find that tax incentive policies are beneficial for economic growth if the policies 
address any market failures that have prevented the efficient use of resources in the past, such as 
addressing an issue of high unemployment. Additionally, the tiered system, which is based on 
economic need, for providing incentives for investing in areas of more economic distress seems 
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to be the most effective way of generating investment in these target locations. Conversely, other 
authors find that tax incentive policies only serve as a method of resource redistribution from one 
area to another. They also find that typically the costs associated with relocation are higher than 
the provided incentives. Both sides of this discussion have viable support for the authors claims, 
leaving the conclusive findings fairly mixed.  
Another reasoning behind the mixed results is mainly due to the lack of quantitative 
analysis that can be performed. As mentioned throughout the literature, it is difficult to truly 
capture the value added from tax incentive programs because there is not enough timely data that 
has been collected to do so. Additionally, researchers are continually struggling to find an 
economic model that truly captures the full effect of tax incentive programs, including their 
externality effects. Taking all of these pieces of literature together, the findings are relatively 
mixed due to the lack of good and consistent data, as well as, methodology differences that 
cannot be easily comparable across all studies.  
 
Methodology and Data 
The methodology used in this study is a difference-in-difference analysis. This type of 
model is designed to compare the treatment and control groups, before and after a significant 
event to estimate casual effects of that event. In this study, the difference in difference model is 
used to compare one control location against three treatment locations before and after the 
introduction of the NJEOA tax policy. The goal of this type of estimation is to try and capture 
the value added to the NJ municipalities from the tax policy by using a control location without a 
policy to difference out external economic factors that may be occurring as a result of events 
other than the tax policy.   
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The focus of the analysis in this study is the three most distressed municipalities in New 
Jersey: Camden, Trenton, and Atlantic City. Due to limitations in data collection, the analysis 
was performed on a county level basis and I looked at Camden County, Mercer County, and 
Atlantic County. It was difficult to find a control area because of the nature of the policy, which 
was applied to the most economically distressed NJ areas and because a lot of similar areas near 
NJ but in other states also received tax incentive policies around the same time. For example, 
Pennsylvania would have had viable comparison locations that would have worked as a control 
variable, however, Pennsylvania has its ACT 47 economic relief program which was applied to 
many municipalities around the same time as the NJEOA. After analyzing options using data on 
city-level characteristics, the control area was chosen based on a city comparison with Camden, 
Trenton, and Atlantic City but, again, due to data limitations the actual data analysis was done on 
the county level. This makes sense to use county level information because the Camden, 
Trenton, and Atlantic City make up a large percentage of the total population of each of their 
respective counties. The control city that was chosen to compare against these NJ municipalities 
is East St. Louis, IL, with St. Clair County being the comparison county. East St. Louis was 
chosen because of similar pre-policy economic conditions in unemployment rate and per capita 
income with the three NJ municipalities and its proximity to a large metropolitan area, which is 
similar to Camden and Trenton. Even though the county level conditions of the control location 
are slightly less similar than the city conditions, there were still similarities in the level of 
unemployment rates among all three counties before the policy. Additionally, before the policy, 
St. Clair, Camden and Mercer counties all matched with similar trends in per capita income 
patterns. These trends can be seen in the pre-policy years (2010-2012) in Figures 1, 2, and 3.   
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 Three difference-in-difference models are estimated separately for each New Jersey 
county and for each outcome variable. The dependent variables were GDP for all industries, per 
capita income, and the unemployment rate. These three variables are chosen because they are 
indicators of economic growth and business development. Included in each regression (Equation 
1) are a dummy variable for the county, a dummy variable for the post period (after year 2013), 
and the control variables X for race (percent white, black, and other race) and education (percent 
high school graduate). The key parameter of interest, 𝛽3, is the one on the interaction term, or the 
difference-in-difference estimate.  
Equation 1:  
𝑌 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑁𝐽 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦) +  𝛽2(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2013) +  𝛽3(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋 +  𝜀 
This regression is run a total of nine times to account for each dependent variable per New Jersey 
county. In each regression, St. Clair county is the control group.  
 The data collected regarding GDP, per capita income, and unemployment comes from the 
St. Louis FRED database. The control variable data for race and education comes from the US 
Census database. The regression has a total of 40 observations, with data collected over a ten 
year period from 2010 to 2019. 
 
Results 
Before turning to the difference in difference regression models, the raw data are plotted 
in Figures 1, 2, and 3. They show trends in each dependent variable for each NJ county graphed 
against St. Clair County. While these graphs do not account for control variables in the 
difference in difference regression, they show general patterns in the dependent variables and 
provide an easy-to-read visual of changes pre and post policy.  
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Figure 1 shows GDP of all industries for each county compared against St. Clair. In the 
first graph, Camden and St. Clair have similar trends before the policy. In 2013, the year the 
policy was implemented, you see Camden’s trend line grow at a faster rate than St. Clair’s trend 
line, indicating that the GDP in Camden grew as a result of the NJEOA. The second graph shows 
similar results as the first one, with Mercer experiencing even steeper growth patterns in GDP 
during the post policy years. The third graph comparing Atlantic with St. Clair shows very 
minimal changes as a result of the NJEOA, with both GDP lines trending in a very similar 
pattern over time.    
Figure 2 illustrates per capita income trends. In the first graph, Camden and St. Clair 
follow a similar growth pattern pre-policy and slightly divert, with Camden growing a bit faster 
than St. Clair post policy. The second graph shows a clearer diversion, with Mercer growing at a 
faster rate than St. Clair after 2013. In the third graph, you see Atlantic and St. Clair are 
extremely close in their trendlines, indicating that Atlantic likely did not have increases in PC 
income as a result of the NJEOA.  
Figure 3 shows trends in unemployment rate. The first graph shows that Camden and St. 
Clair experienced relatively similar levels of unemployment throughout the observed timeframe. 
The second graph shows that Mercer experienced a consistently lower rate of unemployment 
than St. Clair. And the third graph shows that Atlantic experienced a consistently higher level of 
unemployment than St. Clair. All of the unemployment rate graphs do not show very clear 
benefits to employment as a result of the NJEOA.  
The difference-in-difference regression outputs are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Each 
table is grouped by outcome. Within the tables are columns grouped by county and rows for each 
outcome variable. The variables include the key interaction term between the county and post 
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policy, as well as the estimates for county, post policy, and control variables that account for race 
(percent white, black, other race) and education (percent high school graduate). The significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, are also denoted. In almost all of the regressions, except for 
Atlantic/GDP, the race variables are statistically significant. Besides the race variable, the only 
other significant variables are a few of the post policy variables in each regression and the county 
variables. The interaction terms, which are the indicators of post-policy improvements, are 
significant for Mercer county when measuring GDP and per capita income. The Mercer/GDP 
interaction term explains that post policy Mercer county increased its GDP by $7,232,160.00, 
which is a 27% increase from the pre-policy mean (2010-2012), compared to St. Clair county. 
This variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Additionally, the 
Mercer/PC income interaction term explains that post policy, Mercer county increased its per 
capita income level by $6,619.40, which is a 12% increase from the pre-policy mean, compared 
to St. Clair county. This variable is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of the NJEOA was to incentivize businesses to relocate in the more 
economically distressed areas of the state and for these businesses to create additional jobs for 
the local population in order to strengthen New Jersey’s economic wellbeing and improve its 
competitive edge in domestic and global economies. To accomplish these goals, the purpose of 
the NJEOA was to provide different quantities of tax credits and reimbursement grants to fill 
financial gaps in development projects contingent upon the creation or retainment of a targeted 
quantity of jobs. Previous literature on tax incentive policy and its benefits show mixed results, 
with some authors claiming tax policy is merely a resource redistribution system that does not 
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create an overall net benefit to the overall economy, and other authors claiming that tax policy 
provides economic benefits as long as the added investment is greater than the costs associated 
with the policy. But, again, overall findings are truly mixed, and this is mainly because it is 
difficult to perform a thorough analysis of the true quantifiable benefits of tax policy due to the 
lack of timely and detailed data regarding policy and the locations the policies are applied to. In 
my own analysis of the NJEOA tax incentive policy on the three most vulnerable counties, I also 
find mixed results with some of the county outcomes receiving in economic benefits and others 
not showing any improvements.  
It was surprising to see that the only interaction terms that are significant are the 
Mercer/GDP and Mercer/PC income variables. This is surprising because I assumed that some of 
the Camden measurements would be significant as well due to the fact that the state contributed a 
lot of investment from the NJEOA into Camden. It is very interesting that the coefficients for the 
interaction terms on Camden/GDP and Camden/PC income are negative; I assumed these values 
would be positive, again because Camden was one of the main target municipalities that the 
NJEOA focused on, and the county as a whole has experienced numerous improvements in 
economic conditions since before the policy was put in place. The results for Atlantic County are 
interesting because they show that GDP and per capita income declined, and unemployment rate 
increased from the policy – these findings are the complete opposite compared to the findings for 
Mercer and partially for Camden. A reasoning behind the Atlantic results may be because 
Mercer and Camden are better comparison locations with St. Clair due to more similarities in pre 
policy conditions; the descriptive graphs show more similar pre-trend conditions between 
Camden and St. Clair and also between Mercer and St. Clair.  
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The regression results slightly differ from the descriptive data graphs. For Mercer/GDP 
and Mercer/PC Income, the trends in both the regression and descriptive data portray a similar 
conclusion that the NJEOA helped improve both outcomes for Mercer. The Camden/GDP 
descriptive data depicts improvements in the GDP variable; however, the regression estimate is a 
negative relationship. Similarly with Camden/PC Income, the graph seems to show slight 
improvements, but again, the regression estimate is negative. The results for Atlantic County in 
the descriptive graphs and regression seem to align because the graph shows very slight 
improvements in per capita income and GDP does not seem to have any changes; the negative 
coefficients are not surprising for the regression due to the lack of clear improvements in the 
descriptive graphs. Lastly, the unemployment rate measurement for all of the counties does not 
show any clear changes between the NJ counties and St. Clair.  
Differences in the regression and descriptive graphs likely stem from the inclusion of the 
control variables. The purpose of including control variables is to soak up factors that are 
different in each area and are potentially correlated with the outcomes as differential time 
changes by county. For example, controlling for race may help account for potential differences 
and trends in household income among the different counties. Typically, higher percentages of 
minority race areas are correlated with lower levels of household income, therefore, controlling 
for this variable helps isolate this difference so you can analyze the true effects to the dependent 
variable being measured. Controlling for education helps to accomplish similar goals. Higher 
percentages of high school graduates per area are typically correlated with higher household 
incomes, therefore, controlling for education helps isolate the related effects of education and 
allows for a better estimate of the tested dependent variable. In almost all of the regressions, the 
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race variables are statistically significant, which shows that this control variable has a significant 
impact on the results of the dependent variable measurements.  
If data could have been collected on a city level basis, this analysis may be more 
indicative of positive effects because it would be more focused on the specific municipalities. 
Camden, Trenton, and Atlantic are the municipalities that received the most attention, so using 
their county level data is not as clearly indicative of the specific cities. Similarly, the comparison 
to East St. Louis (instead of its county) maybe be a stronger correlation because the entire county 
has different conditions than the individual city.   
Overall, in this paper I tested the effects of the NJEOA on GDP, per capita income, and 
unemployment rate for the three most vulnerable New Jersey counties and found that the policy 
had positive outcomes for some county estimates, while other estimates were zero or even 
negative. These mixed findings are consistent with previous literature that discussed many mixed 
results regarding tax policy outcomes.  
This analysis adds to the literature by providing support that these types of programs do 
not always universally accomplish their goals. States and municipalities developing tax incentive 
policy should think carefully when structuring the different programs and should run multiple 
cost-benefit analyses to maximize their understanding of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of imposing any tax incentive policy. By analyzing tax policy structure and 
understanding which components of the policy are beneficial, policy makers should be able to 
develop policies that will help economically depressed areas and the economy as a whole to 
improve and succeed. Further studies analyzing tax policy should continue to be completed in 
order to maximize our understanding of tax policy and to continue to assist policy makers in 
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Table 2: Grow NJ Award Structure 
 
Project Type Base Amount (per 
new/retained job per 
year) 
Gross Amount (per 






$5,000 $15,000 $30,000,000 
Garden State Growth 
Zone  
$5,000 $15,000 $30,000,000 
 
$35,000,000 in 
Camden and Atlantic 
City 
Urban Transit Hub 
Municipality 
 




$4,000 $11,000 $8,000,000 
Priority Area $3,000 $10,500 $4,000,000  
 
*Not more than 90% 
of business 
withholdings from the 
qualified facility 
Other Eligible Area $500 $6,000 $2,500,000 
 
*Not more than 90% 
of business 
withholdings from the 
qualified facility  
Source: Review of Grow New Jersey and Economic Redevelopment and Growth Programs 
from the New Jersey Economic Development Authority 
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-3.87e+07   
(5.87e+07) 
N=40; *10% significance **5% significance; ***1% significance 
Data sources: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ ; https://data.census.gov/cedsci/  
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Camden Mercer Atlantic 






















57,006.03   
(101,656.1) 




166,573.6**   
(80,884.1) 






N=40; *10% significance **5% significance; ***1% significance 
Data sources: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ ; https://data.census.gov/cedsci/  
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Camden Mercer Atlantic 




0.0107    
(0.0117) 














-0.2322     
(0.1416) 
-0.3429    
(0.2112) 
Other -0.5817***   
(0.1219) 
-0.3411**   
(0.1258) 








N=40; *10% significance **5% significance; ***1% significance 
Data sources: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ ; https://data.census.gov/cedsci/  
 
